Does Congress Have the Authority to Abrogate a State\u27s Sovereign Immunity Under the Constitution\u27s Bankruptcy Clause? by Anzivino, Ralph C.
Marquette University Law School
Marquette Law Scholarly Commons
Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship
1-1-2004
Does Congress Have the Authority to Abrogate a
State's Sovereign Immunity Under the
Constitution's Bankruptcy Clause?
Ralph C. Anzivino
Marquette University Law School, ralph.anzivino@marquette.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/facpub
Part of the Law Commons
Publication Information
Ralph C. Anzivino, Does Congress Have the Authority to Abrogate a State's Sovereign Immunity
Under the Constitution's Bankruptcy Clause?, 2003-04 Term Preview U.S. Sup. Ct. Cas. 252 (2004).
© 2004 American Bar Association. This information or any portion thereof may not be copied or
disseminated in any form or by any means or downloaded or stored in an electronic database or
retrieval system without the express written consent of the American Bar Association.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
Anzivino, Ralph C., "Does Congress Have the Authority to Abrogate a State's Sovereign Immunity Under the Constitution's
Bankruptcy Clause?" (2004). Faculty Publications. Paper 412.
http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/facpub/412
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
Does Congress Have the Authority to Abrogate
a State's Sovereign Immunity
Under the Constitution's Bankruptcy Clause?
by Ralph C. Anzivino
PREVIEW of U ritdc States Supreme Court Cases, pages 252-256. © 2004 American Bar Association.
ISSUE
Does Congress have the authority to
abrogate state sovereign immunity
under the bankruptcy clause of the
United States Constitution?
FACTS
Between July 1988 and February
1990, Pamela Hood, the respondent
in this case, signed promissory
notes for student loans guaranteed
by the petitioner, the Tennessee
Student Assistance Corporation
("the state" or "TSAC"). TSAC is a
governmental corporation created
by the Tennessee legislature to
administer student assistance pro-
grams and authorized by law to
guarantee student loans under the
provisions of the Federal Higher
Education Act of 1965.
On February 26, 1999, the debtor
filed a "no asset" Chapter 7 bank-
ruptcy in the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the Western
District of Tennessee. Sallie Mae
Service, Inc. submitted a proof of
claim to the bankruptcy court, which
it subsequently assigned to TSAC.
Ralph C. Anzivino is a professor
of law at Marquette University
Law School in Milwaukee,
Wisconsin. He can be reached at
ralph.anzivino@marquette.edu
or 414-288-7094.
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TSAC, however, never filed a proof of
claim in the bankruptcy case.
Respondent received her general
discharge on June 4, 1999, without
addressing her student loans. She
subsequently reopened the case on
September 14, 1999, and on
October 14, 1999, she filed a com-
plaint in bankruptcy court seeking a
hardship discharge under 11 U.S.C.
§ 532(a)(8). She named the United
States of America, its Department of
Education and Sallie Mae, as defen-
dants. On February 22, 2000, the
debtor amended her complaint to
add TSAC as a defendant. At the
time she filed the complaint, the
debtor owed the state S4,169.31.
The state moved to dismiss the
complaint, arguing that the bank-
ruptcy court did not have jurisdic-
tion over TSAC based on its sover-
eign immunity as a state agency.
Following a hearing, the bankruptcy
court denied the state's motion. In
re Hood, 2000 WL 33965623
(Bankr. W.D.Tenn. 2000). The bank-
TENNESSEE STUDENT ASSISTANCE
CoR. v. HOOD
DOCKET No. 02-1606
ARGUMENT DATE:
MARCH 1, 2004
FROM: THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
. ., - ......
ruptcy court found that TSAC was a
state agency entitled to assert the
protection of sovereign immunity
under the Eleventh Amendment,
but that Congress validly abrogated
that immunity when it enacted 11
U.S.C. § 106(a).
The state appealed to the United
States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel
("BAP") for the Sixth Circuit, which
affirmed the bankruptcy court's
decision. In re Hood, 262 BR 412
(6th Cir. 2001). The panel conclud-
ed that the states ceded their sover-
eignty over the bankruptcy dis-
charge, as a part of the plan of the
Constitutional Convention and that,
where there is no sovereignty, there
can be no sovereign immunity. On
the state's appeal, the court of
appeals affirmed the decision. In re
Hood, 319 F.3d 755 (6th Cir. 2003).
The Sixth Circuit ruled that
Congress validly abrogated the
states' sovereign immunity through
the exercise of its power under the
Bankruptcy Clause, U.S. Const. art.
I, § 8, cl. 4, because the states, in
ratifying that provision, had already
agreed to surrender their immunity
with respect to bankruptcy laws. In
reaching this decision, the Sixth
Circuit relied on its interpretation
of The Federalist Papers, notably
Nos. 32 and 81. Based on its reading
of those two essays, the court found
that there was no other conclusion
than that there had been a waiver of
the states' immunity in the plan of
the convention with respect to
bankruptcy cases when the states
granted Congress power to make
uniform laws on the subject. The
state appealed to the Supreme
Court, and certiorari was granted.
Tennessee Student Assistance
Corporation v. Hood, 124 S.Ct. 45
(2003).
CASE ANALYSIS
The Eleventh Amendment provides
that "the judicial power of the
United States shall not be construed
to extend to any suit commenced
against one of the United States."
The Eleventh Amendment presup-
poses that each state is a sovereign
entity in our federal system and, by
virtue of its sovereignty, not
amenable to suit by an individual
without its consent. However,
Congress may abrogate a state's sov-
ereign immunity provided it has act-
ed pursuant to a valid exercise of
power. The issue here is whether
Article I's Bankruptcy Clause is suf-
ficient authorization for Congress's
passage of § 106 of the Bankruptcy
Code, which abrogates a state's sov-
ereign immunity in bankruptcy.
Petitioner TSAC asserts that the
powers allocated to Congress by
Article I of the Constitution to legis-
late on the topics specified therein
do not include the power to create
private rights of action against
unconsenting states. The states'
immunity from private-party suits is
based on the precepts that each
state is a sovereign entity in our fed-
eral system, and that it is inherent
in the nature of sovereignty not to
be amenable to suits brought by an
individual without the sovereign's
consent. Petitioner believes that
state immunity fundamentally limits
Article I. Thus, Congress may not
use its Article I powers to abolish
that immunity, regardless of the
breadth of the Article I powers.
TSAC maintains that this case is
squarely controlled by the Supreme
Court's recent decision in Seminole
Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S.
44 (1996). In Seminole Tribe, the
tribe challenged an Eleventh Circuit
decision that held that the Eleventh
Amendment barred the tribe's suit
against the state of Florida. The basis
of the tribe's suit was the Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act, which was
passed by Congress pursuant to the
Indian Commerce Clause in Article
I. The Supreme Court held that the
Indian Commerce Clause did not
grant Congress the power to abrogate
the state's Eleventh Amendment
immunity.
Also in Seminole Tribe, the
Supreme Court overruled its earlier
decision in Pennsylvania v. Union
Gas, 491 U.S. 1 (1989). In Union
Gas, the Supreme Court had ruled
that Congress had the authority to
abrogate a state's immunity through
another Article I power, the
Commerce Clause. Thus, TSAC
argues that since neither the Article
I Indian Commerce Clause, nor the
Article I Interstate Commerce
Clause authorizes Congress to abro-
gate a state's sovereign immunity,
the Article I Bankruptcy Clause can
fair no better. Notably, all three
clauses are Article I powers, and
must be uniformly treated. Article I
powers cannot be used to circum-
vent the constitutional limitations
placed upon federal jurisdiction.
Article III is the primary province of
federal court jurisdiction, not
Article I.
Article I's Bankruptcy Clause has a
uniformity requirement.
Respondent Hood claims that the
constitutional requirement of uni-
formity reflects the Framers' belief
that exclusive power over bankrupt-
cy was surrendered to the federal
government. TSAC maintains that
the fact that a law must be "uni-
form" does not provide any greater
federal authority than other Article
I powers. The Constitution's refer-
ence to "uniformity" is presumably
meant to show that Congress must
have "complete" or "exclusive"
authority to make laws in regards to
that subject, or else there would not
be a single, "uniform" law.
However, in petitioner's view, one
cannot equate broad federal legisla-
tive authority with an equally broad
federal right to abrogate a state's
(Continued on Page 254)
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immunity. The argument is simply a
non sequitur. Leaving aside the
residual state legislative authority
that exists with respect to insolven-
cy, the lack of state legislative
authority is irrelevant under
Seminole Tribe. No matter how
complete or exclusive-or "uni-
form"-the Article I lawmaking
powers, they do not override state
sovereign immunity, unless
Seminole Tribe is to be overruled.
The respondent cannot avoid the
impact of Seminole Tribe by simply
recasting a discussion about "ple-
nary" powers into one about "uni-
form" powers.
TSAC further notes that to suggest
that the "uniformity" requirement
confers exclusive power upon
Congress to establish a perfectly
uniform system of bankruptcy at
the expense of all rights of state sov-
ereignty is at odds with experience.
The "uniformity" requirement is
simply a geographic requirement,
and nothing more. The reality that
bankruptcy law is not fully dictated
by federal law, nor, indeed, is overly
uniform is easily demonstrated. A
bankruptcy law may be "uniform"
even though it incorporates state
law so that there are different
results in different states. The cur-
rent Bankruptcy Code uses state law
to determine the "property" rights
that go into the "property of the
estate." Also, under 11 U.S.C.
§ 522(b), state law may require-to
the total exclusion of federal law-
that state laws decide what comes
out of the estate as exemptions.
The "basic federal rule" in bank-
ruptcy is that state law governs the
substance of claims and the burden
of proof required. Similarly, the
determination of property interests
in the assets of an estate is made
under state law. Also, the
Bankruptcy Code does not create a
federal right of setoff, but, instead,
generally preserves existing setoff
rights created under state law. Nor
does the uniformity provision forbid
Congress from distinguishing
between different classes of debtors,
different industries, or different
creditors. The uniformity require-
ment of the Bankruptcy Clause is
not an Equal Protection Clause for
bankrupts. Certain entities, such as
insurance companies and most
banks are not permitted to file for
bankruptcy protection. There are
special chapters for family farmers
and municipalities. Railroads are
not permitted to file under Chapter
7, but may file under Chapter 11.
Also, there are many areas in which
the Bankruptcy Code treats govern-
mental units differently from the
way it treats other creditors. Taxes,
for instance, receive priority under
§ 507(a)(8), but tax liens can be
subordinated to priority creditors in
§ 724(b) and, under § 505, debtors
have special rights to relitigate tax
claims. Similarly, there is a police
and regulatory exception in
§ 362(b)(4) to the portion of the
automatic stay set out in § 362(a),
and governmental entities are sub-
ject to special antidiscrimination
provisions in § 525 to which there is
no police and regulatory exception.
And, as pertains to this case,
Congress has repeatedly tightened
the limits on when debtors may dis-
charge student loans that were
made, insured, or guaranteed by a
governmental unit. These are but a
mere sampling that bankruptcy law
is permeated in every aspect with
state law considerations rather than
being a system rigidly dictated sole-
ly by federal law.
In sum, the "uniformity" provision
of the Bankruptcy Clause does not
automatically preempt the entire
field of bankruptcy, does not nullify
all state laws on the subject, does
not require that identical laws gov-
erning debtor-creditor relationships
must apply in every state, and does
not require Congress to treat all
classes of debtors, creditors, or
debts the same. Clearly, the unifor-
mity requirement is designed to pre-
empt any conflicting state laws, but
was not intended to abrogate a
state's immunity. In fact, a bank-
ruptcy system that uniformly
observes the sovereign immunity of
the states would be constitutionally
"uniform."
Finally, even if the Bankruptcy
Clause did require strict, literal uni-
formity, such federal power would
not eliminate the state's immunity
from private actions. The Patent
Clause, also an Article I clause,
demands a uniform system of exclu-
sively federal law to secure for
authors and inventors the exclusive
right to their respective writings and
discoveries. Yet the Supreme Court
has already held that, despite the
need for uniformity, Article I of the
Constitution did not divest the
states of immunity from private-
party suits in the areas of patent
and trademark law. Similarly, the
Court rejected the argument that
the constitutional necessity of uni-
formity in the regulation of mari-
time commerce overrides the states'
legislative sovereignty in the face of
the federal government's regulation
authority on that subject. In the
petitioner's view, the arguments are
no stronger for the conclusion that
the "uniformity" requirement in the
Bankruptcy Clause is sufficient to
override the states' retained sover-
eign immunity. The Supreme Court
has ruled that there must be "com-
pelling evidence" of an intention to
override the states' immunity in
order to justify a finding that
Congress has the power to do so. If
such evidence does not exist, there
can be no finding that the states
waived their immunity so as to
allow Congress to abrogate it by leg-
islative action. There is no legal or
factual basis for treating the
Bankruptcy Clause any differently
than the Commerce Clause, the
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Patent Clause, or other Article I
powers. According to the petitioner,
the states retain their inherent sov-
ereign immunity from private-party
suits in the field of bankruptcy.
Respondent Hood maintains that
the historical record reflects the
surrender of the sovereign immuni-
ty of the states under the
Bankruptcy Clause. The impetus
for the Bankruptcy Clause in the
Constitution arose from the econo-
my's need for enhanced debtor/
creditor laws. Creditors needed a
better collective mechanism for the
recovery of their claims, and entre-
preneurs needed enhanced protec-
tion from the greater risks of failure
presented by the changing economy.
Merchants and traders who suffered
major reverses were unwilling to
settle with their creditors unless
they knew their debts would be dis-
charged upon the relinquishment of
all their property. Disparate bank-
ruptcy and insolvency laws among
the different states were viewed as a
major impediment to commerce.
The significance of debtor/creditor
issues, including states' immunity,
was reflected in numerous refer-
ences in The Federalist papers. The
Federalist No. 81, a primary author-
ity for understanding Eleventh
Amendment immunity, states in
pertinent part:
It is inherent in the nature of
sovereignty, not to be
amenable to the suit of an
individual without its consent.
This exception, as one of
the attributes of sovereignty, is
now enjoyed by the govern-
ment of every state in the
union. Unless therefore, there
is a surrender of this immunity
in the plan of the convention,
it will remain with the states.
Hamilton explicitly qualified his
description of the breadth of sover-
eign immunity in The Federalist No.
81 by the limitations on sovereignty
described in The Federalist No. 32.
Included in those limitations are
areas, such as bankruptcy, in which
Congress is granted the power to
make uniform laws. TSAC argues
that as The Federalist No. 32
addresses the issue of state sover-
eignty, while The Federalist No. 81
addresses a sovereign's immunity to
suit, the limitations on state sover-
eignty identified in The Federalist
No. 32 are inapplicable to the dis-
cussion of state sovereign immunity
in The Federalist No. 81.
In Hood's view, such an argument
simply ignores the clear intent of
Hamilton in making explicit refer-
ence to The Federalist No. 32 in
The Federalist No. 81. Rather than
being a distinct and unrelated doc-
trine, sovereign immunity has been
viewed by the Supreme Court as "a
fundamental aspect" of state sover-
eignty. Accordingly, it is unsurprising
that Hamilton referred his readers
to The Federalist No. 32 rather than
providing a separate discussion of
the limits being placed on a state's
sovereign immunity in The
Federalist No. 81. Contrary to the
claims of the states, the surrender
of a state's legislative sovereignty
with respect to the enactment of
bankruptcy laws was not enough. In
order for a national bankruptcy law
to function, states also had to relin-
quish their sovereign immunity in
the operation of those laws.
Ultimately, of course, in addressing
the Eleventh Amendment immunity
of the states, the importance of The
Federalist history is to make clear
that the immunity exists today by
constitutional design. Thus, it is in
the language of the Bankruptcy
Clause and the operation of the
bankruptcy system that the abroga-
tion of a state's sovereign immunity
is most apparent.
Respondent further asserts that the
uniformity requirement of the
Bankruptcy Clause requires the
abrogation of a state's Eleventh
Amendment immunity. The
Supreme Court has stated that the
power to pass uniform bankruptcy
laws was intended by the authors of
the Constitution to be exclusive in
Congress, or, at least, that they
expected the power vested in that
body would be exercised so as to
prevent its exercise by the states.
The references to uniformity and
exclusivity reflect the Supreme
Court's understanding that the
Framers believed that the bankrupt-
cy power had been fully surren-
dered to the national government.
The surrender of the bankruptcy
power would include all aspects of
sovereignty, including state legisla-
tion and immunity.
Hood argues that the collective
nature of a bankruptcy requires
jurisdiction over a state. An inher-
ent conflict exists between the
Eleventh Amendment and the col-
lective nature of a bankruptcy. The
Eleventh Amendment bars a court
from asserting jurisdiction over a
nonconsenting state. A state's asser-
tion of its Eleventh Amendment
rights, therefore, strikes at the heart
of the bankruptcy system. In
essence, bankruptcy entails bringing
all of the debtor's property into one
forum, dividing that property among
all who can demonstrate a lawful
claim to it under the Bankruptcy
Code, and allowing the debtor to
continue its existence relieved of
that burden. States are major play-
ers in that system. Actions in bank-
ruptcy are not simply individual
suits against a state. Instead, they
are part of a collective process in
which all creditors of a debtor,
including very often the federal gov-
ernment, have an interest.
The collective nature of a bankrupt-
cy necessarily alters a state's ability
to assert its sovereign immunity.
(Continued on Page 256)
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The assertion of a state's sovereign
immunity can be particularly harm-
ful. For example, if the state had a
lien on a bankrupt debtor's property
but was not made a party to the
bankruptcy, it could wait until the
bankruptcy case had concluded and
then bring a foreclosure action in
state court to fully recover its debt.
Thus, unlike other creditors, a state
would be able to avoid a bankruptcy
and recover its claim after the
financial strength of the debtor has
been restored by the sacrifices that
other creditors had been forced to
bear in the bankruptcy case. The
case law is replete with recent
examples of states using their sover-
eign immunity to thwart the bank-
ruptcy process at its most elemental
level. In sum, if a state were free to
exercise its sovereign immunity in
bankruptcy, it would be able to use
this power, not as a means of pro-
tecting itself, but as a mechanism
for gaining an unfair advantage at
the expense of other creditors, as
well as the debtor. Without the con-
sent of a state, a bankruptcy court
would not have the required juris-
diction to alter a state's legal rights.
According to Hood, case law illus-
trates the dangers that would arise
from a blanket assertion of a state's
sovereign immunity in bankruptcy
and in this case the state has failed
to demonstrate how these dangers
can be avoided.
Finally, respondent asserts that in
the absence of a hearing in bank-
ruptcy court, the states have failed
to provide any viable alternative
means for the discharge of a student
loan. State courts do not provide a
viable alternative because a state is
protected by the Eleventh
Amendment from the adjudication
of a federal cause of action in its
own courts without its consent.
Although TSAC argues that respon-
dent can wait until the state initi-
ates a collection action and at that
juncture raise undue hardship as a
defense, such a course of action
would leave a debtor without its
most basic entitlement under the
Bankruptcy Code-a fresh start-as
a state could wait for years before
commencing a collection action.
Most importantly, the student loan
system is organized in a manner
that avoids the need for commenc-
ing a collection action in state
court. Instead, a student's wages
may be garnished without court
authorization. In fact, the applicable
regulations bar a collection action
when wage garnishment is a viable
alternative. In addition, a debtor's
tax refunds may be intercepted to
obtain repayment of a student loan.
In sum, an essential function of the
bankruptcy system-the discharge
of a student loan-may not be avail-
able if it is dependent upon access
to state courts. In Hood's view, the
absence of a viable state court rem-
edy highlights one of the most
troublesome aspects of upholding a
state's Eleventh Amendment immu-
nity in bankruptcy.
SIGNIFICANCE
In a Republican form of govern-
ment, the strength of each sover-
eign's immunity is critical. The
Eleventh Amendment was created
to protect each state's sovereign
immunity. The Federalist papers
indicated that a state's immunity is
inviolate unless the immunity has
been surrendered in the
Constitution. In other words, for
Congress to abrogate a state's
immunity, it must be pursuant to a
valid exercise of power under the
Constitution. The Supreme Court
had found authority to abrogate a
state's sovereign immunity under
the Fourteenth Amendment.
This case arises under the
Bankruptcy Clause of Article I. In
the passage of the Bankruptcy Code,
Congress abrogated states' sovereign
immunity, and made each state
amenable to suit in federal bank-
ruptcy court. To date however, the
Supreme Court has not found any
Article I powers sufficient to abro-
gate a state's sovereign immunity.
The Court has considered cases
under the Indian Commerce Clause,
the Commerce Clause, and the
Patent Clause, all Article I powers.
This case will tell us whether the
Article I Bankruptcy Clause is suffi-
cient authority to abrogate a state's
sovereign immunity.
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